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Most economists agree that special interest groups can inuence policy and the allocation of eco-
nomic resources.1 But in the strand of the literature that focuses on the impact of special interest
groups on economic well-being there is disagreement on whether or not these eects are benecial.
Indicative of this conict are the contributions of Putnam (1994) and Olson (1982). Analyzing
data across Italian regions, Putnam attributes the more eective governments and better economic
performance of northern regions largely to their high levels of \civic engagement". He argues that
special interest groups increase solidarity and cooperation, attributes necessary for the resolution of
collective action problems.2 Olson, on the other hand, expresses the opposite opinion, and argues
that special interest groups may limit growth possibilities. He observes that they have an incentive
to lobby for socially inecient policies which benet themselves but are costly to society. In either
case it is always assumed that the nature of the special interest groups remains constant over time.
The hypothesis of this paper is that opportunities for rent extraction for special interest groups
have elements of both the Putnam and Olson arguments as they evolve over time. We argue that
even if all projects are assumed to start o as being socially desirable, they will cease to be so at
some point in the future. However, dierent projects become socially undesirable after dierent
intervals of time. It then becomes possible that a government will support a project longer than is
socially desirable.
There are numerous examples of government agencies that have been accused of supporting
certain projects proposed by lobby groups beyond the point at which all productive rents have
been exhausted. A recent example of such a project is the US F-22 Raptor ghter jet. It was
developed in the 1980s to shoot down the latest Soviet combat planes. Even today, the Raptor is
described as technological marvel, and at over a quarter of a billion dollars per plane it is the most
expensive ghter jet ever built. 187 Raptors are in service of the United States Air Force today.3
Hence, as the New York Times put it, \Americans can now feel reassured that if the Soviet Union
ever springs back to life, restarts the Cold War and designs a new MIG ghter more advanced than
anything now in the skies, the United States Air Force is ready."4 Unfortunately, today's foes are
very dierent from those the Raptor was designed to ght. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Army
is ghting a highly motivated, low-tech enemy who blend in and out of urban civilian populations or
hide in remote mountain areas and caves. The Raptor is useless in such an environment, and hence,
1Special interest groups can contribute to a policy maker's political support by making campaign contributions
or by providing information. A rational policy maker takes the eect of these contributions into account for making
policy decisions. See, for example, Peltzman (1976), Hillman (1982), and Grossman and Helpman (1994).
2\Civic engagement", according to Putnam, includes all groups that form in a society because their members
share a common interest. This denition includes community level groups (for example bird watching groups) as well
as organizations on a national level (for example trade unions).
3Source: Airforce-technology.com, accessed on 06/21/2011
4Source: New York Times: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE6D9133DF93AA15753C1A9629C8B63,
accessed on 06/21/2011
1the F-22 has never been used in a war. In July 2009, the US Senate stopped a bill that would have
authorized funds for an additional seven Raptors. President Obama praised the Senate's decision,
saying that any money spent on the ghter was an \inexcusable waste".5
Another example of a military project that was once benecial but has been continued too long
is the German Leopard 2 tank, which has been promoted by the German defense industry.6 This
tank was developed during the Cold War to ght an enemy approaching Germany across the North
German plain. But even the latest version of the Leopard 2 is too big to be useful for other actions.
In fact, the Bundeswehr does not even have a cargo plane large enough to transport the Leopard
2. The latest version has been in active service since 2001. In 2004, the German Bundeswehr still
had 1552 battle tanks of the type Leopard 2 waiting for an enemy to attack.7 Between then and
2008, the Bundeswehr reduced the number of active Leopard 2s to 400.8
There is no doubt that the F-22 Raptor and the Leopard 2 were good investments - good
\projects" - during the Cold War. But support for these projects continued after their purpose for
existence disappeared.
Agricultural subsidies in the US and in Europe provide similar examples. Franklin D. Roosevelt
introduced farm subsidies in the US in the 1930s in response to a massive farm depression and the
eects of a concurrent drought. These were, according to Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace,
\a temporary solution to deal with an emergency". In Europe, agricultural subsidies started after
WW2 within the independent European nations. The EU took over these national programs in
the 1950s and 1960s. The initial reason for these programs in Europe was to encourage increased
food production. After the EU took over, the programs were continued to ensure that European
countries did not come into conict over scarce foodstus. Today neither of these reasons hold yet
the programs remain in place and prices received by farmers in the EU and agricultural producer
prices in the US are 33% and 15% respectively above world levels.9 There is evidence that the EU
and the US would be better o without agricultural protection.10
The examples above suggest that, as in Putnam, interest groups initially exist to communicate
to a government the existence of opportunities to create productive benets that initially increase
social welfare. However, just as Olson argues, once the social benets have been fully extracted,
the special interest groups may switch to pure rent extraction, to the detriment of social welfare.11
5Source: New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/business/22defense.html, accessed on
06/21/2011
6See Arno Neuber, 2009, \Zum Barbecue mit Ruestungsbossen", IMI-Magazin, for an overview of the close
relationship between the defense industry and the parliamentary defense committee in Germany.
7Source: Otfried Nassauer for the Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security, October 30 2004.
8Source: Das Schwarze Barett: Ausruestung der Panzertruppe im \Heer 2010", 32/2004, p.23
9The base year for these statistics is 2001. For more detail see Tokarick (2005)
10See for example Anderson (1998), Tokarick (2005)
11The examples above suggest that the presence of special interest groups can be valuable to welfare maximizing
governments because they can provide information about productive projects. However, not all public projects are
advertised by special interest groups. But for the theoretical approach to explain the anecdotal evidence, this study
focuses on the cases in which special interest groups have more information about rent generating projects than
2Whenever the presence of lobby groups leads to Pareto-dominated policies, the question arises
of why voters tolerate such policy choices. The existing literature has focused mainly on one
side of the answer to this question: on the explanation for inecient short term biases in public
spending.12 Coate and Morris (1999) model how special interest groups can \buy" policy decisions
from politicians, but the politician is not then re-elected. They suggest that voters will not support
policies that provide temporary eciency improvements if they cannot control how long a costly
policy persists once it is introduced. Aidt and Dutta (2007) nd that growth in government
eventually leads to a bias in public expenditure towards short term projects and argue that this
can be explained by a desire on the part of the electorate to check frequently on the performance
of politicians.
The anecdotal evidence of the defense and agricultural industries in Europe and in the US dis-
cussed above suggests that these projects were not inecient investments when they were started.
But even though they were initially socially benecial, government support for these projects con-
tinued after their purpose for existence disappeared. A main contribution of the model introduced
in this paper is that it displays an equilibrium which rationalizes these observations. Hence, the
model provides an explanation for a long term bias in public spending. Politicians may be ratio-
nally re-elected even if they pursue policies that persist \too long", because if they did not then
the quality of the pool of new projects would deteriorate. This deterioration arises because of an
adverse selection eect under which the lobbies oering the projects that are socially most benecial
would not join the pool because of their dependence on future government support.13
The simple model developed in this paper follows the tradition of formal political economy
models; we intend to develop a systematic understanding of complex social phenomena and abstract
from much of the detail.
2 A model of lobbying
2.1 Players
The economy consists of an electorate, a set of politicians, and a set of lobbying rms. In each
period the electorate must choose a politician to act as the government, the politician elected must
in turn choose which productive projects to pursue from a set of alternatives oered to them by
the lobbying rms. The electorate are innitely lived. Each lobbying rm lives for at most two
periods, and oers a single potential project to the government in its rst period of life. Politicians
governments.
12Cassing (1991) provides a model of \policy hysteresis", but in this framework there is no punishment for the
politicians if they cater to special interests.
13The dierence between the adverse selection eect here and the one developed by Le Breton and Salanie (2003)
is that, according to the latter, the reason for adverse selection is direct competition between the lobbies, whereas in
the model developed in this paper, adverse selection is caused by information asymmetries between the lobbies and
the government.
3may hold oce for a maximum of two periods. In every period there are potentially present in
the economy \old" lobbies, (O), in the second period of their lives, and \young" lobbies, (Y), in
their rst. Hence the life of a lobby may coincide with the period in oce of a single politician or
overlap the terms of two.
There are two dierent types of lobby groups in the economy: low, (L), and high, (H), which
occur in the proportions  and 1    respectively. High type lobbies promote projects that are
socially productive for two periods. Low type lobbies promote projects that are only socially
productive for a single period. It is therefore natural to assume that the xed up-front costs of a
project are higher for high types. This might be due to something as simple as the fact that the
buildings and plant required to continue production of a product for several years need to more
durable, longer-lived, and therefore more costly that those required only to last for a short time
span.14
Following Besley (2006) there are two types of politicians who may form the government; good,
(G), and bad, (B), who occur in the population of potential politicians with frequencies  and
1    respectively.15 Good politicians act in the interests of voters. Bad politicians maximize
their own private rents. The electorate choose a politician to select projects on their behalf. In
periods in which the incumbent is ineligible for re-election this takes the form of selecting a random
replacement from the pool of potential candidates. In periods where the incumbent is eligible for
re-election the selection is determined by majority voting.
There is a pool of potential lobbies in the polity. In each period, every potential lobby must
decide whether or not to become active and join the pool of lobbies from which the government
selects its projects.
2.2 Timing and information structure
The timing of the agents' decisions is illustrated in Figure 1. In any period the sequence of events
is as follows: First lobbies of either type must choose whether to join the pool from which projects
are selected. Next the electorate choose the politician to run the government for that period. If
an incumbent is eligible for re-election the electorate base their voting decisions on observations of
the politician's previous choices and the payos they, the electorate, enjoyed. If the incumbent
is ineligible the politician is selected by random draw. The selected politician then simultaneously
draws a potential project to realize from the pool promoted by the lobbies, and whether or not to
14Relaxing this assumption would not change the equilibrium of the baseline model. But it would alter the results
of the extension to the baseline model: even good governments would be more likely to support low type lobbies
ineciently long, and there would not be an adverse selection eect.
15For a positive theory of public expenditure, a benevolent politician is, as Aidt and Dutta (2007) put it , \a
myth". But if some politicians are marginally \better" than others (in the sense that they are more idealistic or more
altruistic than others) then the notation of good and bad politicians suces to model such dierences.
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The politician knows the type of the old project but only learns the type of the new project after
it is selected. The projects, potentially both new and old, are realized and the electorate receive
their payos. The game repeats itself in the next period. For simplicity we shall subsequently
assume that the politician selects at most one new project per period, that all agents discount the
future using the common discount factor  < 1, and are risk neutral.
2.3 Payos
2.3.1 Politicians
Politicians of both types receive a combination of wage and ego rent from holding oce denoted
E. Bad politicians may also in principle receive side-payments of R from any lobbies they support




E + R if the politician is bad
E + X if the politician is good
(1)
where j = G;B is used to indicate the politician type.
16There is a large body of literature that deals with competition between lobby groups, the resulting rent-seeking
costs, and the process of how governments choose one lobby group over another. Following Potters and Van Winden
(1992) it is assumed that the informational value of a lobby's signal to the government about its type is not the
content of the message sent but the resources spent on sending the message. Since all lobbies have the same amount
of initial resources in this model, they cannot signal their type to the government.
52.3.2 Lobbies
Lobbies may be young or old and of high or low type (their members are also assumed to be
voters and to receive any payments given to voters). All lobby types supported by the government
receive a per-period subsidy of k: The lobbies' costs depend upon their type and are denoted as
where sfL;Hg: The payos to the lobbies depend on the type of politician (G;B) they face. The





k   as > 0 s = L eY = 1
k   as < 0 s = H eY = 1
 as < 0 e = 0
(2)
Where e is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the lobby receives government support and
0 otherwise. Hence, only if the incumbent politician chooses to realize a young lobby's project
(eY = 1) will the lobby receive support. The rst-period payo from lobbying is positive if the
lobby is a low type and is negative if the lobby is a high type, reecting the high types greater
up-front xed costs. This implies that a high type lobby will not join the pool if it cannot obtain
support in its second period.






k   as   R = 0 s = L eY = 1
k   as < 0 s = H eY = 1
 as < 0 e = 0
(3)
Hence, bad politicians extract maximum private rents from the lobbies, which implies that the
payo of young, low type lobbies is zero if a bad politician is in oce.17





k eO = 1
0 eO = 0
(4)
where k is interpreted as before.





k   R = 0 eO = 1
0 eO = 0
(5)
where R is again a private side-payment from the lobby to the politician.
17It is assumed that bad politicians cannot make the lobbies borrow against future earnings.
62.3.3 Electorate
The electorate receive a per-person net social benet of x from all projects that are socially produc-
tive. This includes the projects adopted from all young lobbies plus the projects of any remaining
old high type lobbies. Should the government support an old low type lobby this yields a net social
cost to the electorate.18
Hence, in every period, the voters receive a payo of






> 0 eY = 1
= 0
(7)
where no identier is required for the payos received by the electorate from young types, and
xs(eO)
8
> > > <
> > > :
> 0 eO = 1 sO = H
< 0 eO = 1 sO = L
= 0 eO = 0
(8)
This simply spells out that only high type projects are socially productive in their second period
of life.
2.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of a strategy for each player dened on the appropriate action space, plus
beliefs for each player that are updated appropriately using Bayes rule such that the conditions for
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium are satised. In each period nature moves rst and selects which
potential lobbies are low and high types with probabilities  and 1   . These probabilities are
known to all the players but only the potential lobbies know their own type. Each type of lobby has
a plan that involves rst whether or not to enter the initial pool from which the politician makes a
selection, and then if selected whether to lobby for one or two periods. As with lobbies nature moves
rst in the selection of a politician's type, choosing good and bad types with probabilities  and
1    respectively. Again these probabilities are known to all the players, but only the politicians
observe their own type. Politicians of either type formulate a plan involving, the random choice of
a new young lobby from the pool, then whether or not to support lobbies of either type in either
period and whether or not to demand any side-payments. The electorate know the values of  and
 and update their beliefs appropriately after observing their own per-period payos. In periods
18All projects are nanced through taxes. Hence, the payos voters receive are the benets from the projects minus
the tax imposed to nance them.
7where an incumbent politician is eligible they choose whether or not to re-elect them. In periods
when an incumbent is not eligible for re-election they select a new politician randomly from the
pool.
Given that politicians cannot be re-elected after their second period in oce, the agents' optimal
strategies can be found by using backward induction.19
Suppose that the incumbent is a good type - by denition they do not demand side payments
and do not support old low type lobbies as this reduces the net social benets enjoyed by the
electorate.20 They do support all young lobbies and high types in the second period of the types
life. Alternatively, suppose the incumbent is a bad type - in their second period in oce they
demand side-payments in return for supporting either high or low type lobbies. In the rst period
a bad politician is in oce they choose between mimicking the good type, which we will refer to
as \pooling" behavior, or \separating" from the good type. If they choose to pool, for purposes
of re-election and the consequent future payments, they must support only old high types. If they
separate, they support both old high and low types, are revealed to be bad and are not re-elected.
Bad politicians extract the maximal private rent from the lobbies. Hence, when they demand
side-payments, they require R(B;i;j) from each active lobby, depending both on whether the lobby
is young or old (i = fY;Og) and on whether it is a high type or a low type (j = fH;Lg). The





k   aL if i = Y
k if i = O
(9)





0 if i = Y
2k   aH if i = O
(10)
We may now characterize when bad politicians engage in pooling or separating behavior in their
rst periods in oce by comparing the appropriate expected payos. Recalling that both good and
bad politicians support old high type lobbies and hence pooling is automatic, we need only give
conditions for pooling and separating when the old lobby is a low type, viz.
Proposition 1 (1) If the old lobby in period 1 is a low type and the young lobby is a high type,
then a bad politician chooses to pool if E  k
  (2k aH) (k aL) (2) If both the young and the
19Having term limits does aect policy choices, as empirically shown by Besley and Case (1995). In this model,
the absence of term limits would exclude the possibility of lame duck politicians. This would be welfare improving in
this framework since bad politicians would be more likely to pool with good types. Term limits are also an important
determinant of the social cost of rent-seeking. Aidt and Hillman (2008) show that rent-seeking is discouraged if policy
makers cannot protect future rents.
20This results from the active lobbies being part of the electorate, as described above.











The proof of this and all subsequent propositions may be found in the appendix.
These pooling conditions imply that the probability that a bad politician pools in period 1
increases in the politician's ego rent E. This follows because pooling ensures re-election and the
receipt of the second period ego rent. Bad politicians are also more likely to pool if they are more
patient, i.e., when the discount factor  is high, simply because they then place a higher value
on the second period payos associated with re-election. A high , i.e., a large share of low type
lobbies in the pool of potential lobbies also increases the probability that a bad politician pools,
because a high share of low type lobbies increases the expected payo to the politician in the second
period.
The pooling condition in the case that the young lobby is a low type is more restrictive if
k  aL +(k  aH) > 0, i.e., if the payo a low type lobby receives in its rst period is larger than
the discounted loss of a high type lobby in its rst period.
Both low and high type lobbies always join the pool of lobbies. Low type lobbies are able to
cover their costs in the rst period and high type lobbies know that any type of politician keeps
supporting them in their second period.
Proposition 2 Pooling is socially desirable.
This follows immediately from noting that a side payment is just a transfer from one agent
to another as is nancial support from a government to a lobby of any type. Hence the social
desirability of pooling hinges on the spillovers generated by lobbies. If there is an old low type
and young high type then with separating behavior old low type lobbies are supported by bad
politicians giving negative spillovers, with pooling these are avoided. When there is an old low
type and young low type then there will be negative spillovers in the current period under sepa-
rating behavior and potentially negative spillovers in the next period if a new bad type politician
replaces the current bad one. Under pooling behavior there will only be negative externalities in
the next period, hence both discounting and the possibility of electing a new bad politician make
this socially superior.
The equilibrium strategies can be summarized as follows. Bad politicians pool with good ones
if the conditions of Proposition 1 hold. This tends to occur if the discount factor  and the share
of low type lobbies  are high. Bad politicians are re-elected in this case. If bad politicians choose
to separate from good ones, they reveal their types and as a consequence, they are not re-elected.
But if there are no re-election concerns, which is the case in a politician's second period, then bad
politicians support old low type lobbies if they picked a low type from the pool in period 1. The
politicians' actions only dier with respect to their decision to continue old projects. All politicians
9choose to support young lobbies in equilibrium and both types of lobbies join the pool.
The model provides two explanations for the problem initially discussed, that is, lobbies that are
no longer socially desirable continue to receive government support. First, old low type lobbies may
receive support from lame-duck politicians in return for side-payments. Second, young bad-type
politicians may choose to separate from good-type ones so as to receive side payments from current
old low type lobbies. Applying this model to the decisions of the US and European governments
to continue agricultural subsidies would suggest that only lame duck or bad politicians have an
incentive to continue these subsidies after their purpose has become obsolete.
But this model is too simplistic to explore such issues as which lobbies choose to enter the pool
of potential lobbies, and what allows bad-type politicians to engage in socially undesirable support
for lobbies in successive periods yet remain in oce.
This last question is of particular interest with respect to term limit eects. The behavior
of a lame duck politician is driven by term limits. In the next section we explain situations in
which politicians engage in undesirable support for lobbies and yet are re-elected, a result that is
independent of term limits.
To investigate these issues we next reduce the information available to politicians, specically
we assume a lobby's type is no longer directly observable by a politician. This allows both good
and bad politicians to potentially support old low type lobbies. But this implies that the electorate
cannot perfectly deduce a politicians type from observing payos, potentially allowing bad types
that support old low type lobbies to gain re-election.
3 The model with unobservable lobby types
In the baseline specication above it was assumed that a politician knows a lobby's type as soon as
the latter is picked from the pool of potential lobbies. In the following extension I consider the case
in which the lobbies' types are no longer observable by the politician. This is important because
in reality it is often dicult for governments to foresee the exact impact a project has on voter
welfare. For example, given that the relationship of a country to its potential enemies does not
change discretely, it is questionable whether national governments can determine how long their
military projects are benecial. Hence, in the following, we modify the model above by assuming
that politicians cannot distinguish between high and low type lobbies until after the projects are
completed.
3.1 Equilibrium
As in the baseline specication, the agents' optimal strategies can be found by using backward
induction. Good politicians support all young lobbies, and they would like to support old high
10types but not old low types. Since they cannot distinguish between the lobby types, politicians
support old lobbies as long as this maximizes expected voter welfare. The necessary condition for
supporting old and young lobbies is given by Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Good politicians support both lobby types as long as   1
2.
This condition implies that good politicians will support all old lobbies if there are at least as
many high type lobbies as low type lobbies in the pool of potential lobbies.
Alternatively, suppose the incumbent is a bad type. In their second period in oce they demand
side-payments in return for supporting either high or low type lobbies. In the rst period a bad
politician is in oce they choose between pooling with or separating from the good types. Pooling
is automatic if   1
2, i.e., if good politicians support both types of lobbies. If  > 1
2, bad politicians
can choose to pool and only support young lobbies for purposes of re-election and the consequent
future payments. If they separate and support both young and old lobbies, they are revealed to be
bad types and are not re-elected. Bad politicians engage in pooling behavior in their rst periods
in oce if the condition in Proposition 4 holds.










(1   )(2k  
aH) + aL.
This implies that bad politicians are more likely to pool if the fraction of low type lobbies in the
pool of potential lobbies is small since this implies that the probability of receiving side payments
from old low type lobbies in the politician's rst period is small. Bad politicians are also more
likely to pool if they are more patient, i.e., when the discount factor  is high, simply because they
then place a higher value on the second period payos associated with re-election. The eect of
the per-period subsidy k on a bad politician's decision about whether or not to pool with good
types is positive as long as   (1   )2, which implies that a high k makes pooling more likely if
the discount factor is suciently high and the share of low types  is suciently small. This again
hinges on the politician's valuation of future payos.
Unlike in the baseline model, not all lobbies always join the pool of potential lobbies. High
type lobbies only join if the fraction of high type lobbies is suciently large, more precisely, when
Proposition 5 holds.
Proposition 5 High type lobbies join the pool as long as   1
2.
This is the case because high type lobbies only join the pool if they are supported by good
politicians. The reason for this is that the expected payo of high type lobbies is negative if only
bad politicians support them in the lobbies' second period. If high type lobbies do not join the








11which implies that pooling is more likely if there are only low type lobbies in the pool.
Comparing the pooling conditions of this extension to the ones of the baseline model shows that
the latter are more restrictive.
Proposition 6 Pooling is more likely in the version of the model with unobservable lobby types
than it is in the baseline model.
In the baseline model, the only uncertainty about a bad politician's payo in the second period
is the type of the new lobby in period 2. In the extension to this model, politicians have no
information about the two lobbies they can choose to support. This makes separating behavior
more risky and therefore pooling more attractive.
If politicians cannot observe the types of the lobbies, high type lobbies would like to change
the information structure and signal their type to the government - in which case they would be
supported for sure. Following Potters (1992) it can be assumed that the informational value of
the signal is not the content of the message sent but the resources spent on sending the message.
Since all potential lobbies in the pool are assumed to have the same amount of resources, low type
lobbies are able to signal the exact same way as high types. This implies that high types cannot
distinguish themselves from low types by signaling.
As in the baseline model, pooling is socially desirable if politicians cannot observe the lobbies'
type.
Proposition 7 Pooling is socially desirable.
The social desirability of pooling hinges on the expected spillovers generated by lobbies, just as
in the baseline model. Whether bad politicians pool with or separate from good types, the expected
voter payo is always higher in the baseline model. The reason for this is that politicians have
more information to base their decisions on in the baseline model.
The equilibrium strategies can be summarized as follows. Bad politicians pool with good ones
if   1
2 and if the condition in Proposition 4 holds, which tends to occur if the share of low type
lobbies is high. Bad politicians are re-elected in this case. If bad politicians choose to separate
from good ones, they reveal their types, and as a consequence they are not re-elected. But if there
are no re-election concerns, which is the case in a politician's second period, then bad politicians
always support old lobbies. The politicians' actions only dier with respect to their decisions to
continue old projects. All politicians choose to support young lobbies in equilibrium. Low type
lobbies always join the pool of lobbies, and high types only join if good politicians support them
in their, the lobbies', second period, i.e., if   1
2.
12The model with unobservable lobby types provides the same two explanations for the problem
initially discussed as the baseline model. First, old low type lobbies may receive support from
lame-duck politicians in return for side-payments. Second, young bad-type politicians may choose
to separate from good-type ones so as to receive side payments from current old low type lobbies.
In addition, this specication addresses circumstances under which some lobbies are not willing
to enter the pool of potential lobbies. This specication shows that if a politician cannot clearly
observe a lobby's type, there are circumstances under which even a good politician provides support
for low type lobbies in the second period. This gives bad-type politicians an additional opportunity
to engage in socially undesirable support of lobbies in successive periods yet remain in oce. Hence,
if politicians cannot clearly observe a lobby's type, then there are cases in which voters are willing
to accept a long-run bias in public policies, i.e., re-elect politicians even if they fear that some
projects are supported ineciently long.
Applying this model to the decision of the US government to continue funding the F-22 Raptor
would suggest the following. At the time when the project was started it was very dicult to
foresee the end of the Cold War. Hence, even good politicians might have continued the funding
for the Raptor, because of the limited information available to them.
4 Conclusions
The hypothesis of this paper is that a dynamic relationship exists between politicians and lobbyists.
Anecdotal evidence of support for military projects and agricultural subsidies suggest that, as in
Putnam, special interest groups initially exist to communicate to a government the existence of
opportunities to create productive benets. Such lobbying activities may initially increase social
welfare. However, just as Olson argues, once these benets from an opportunity have been fully
extracted the special interest groups may switch to pure rent extraction behavior, to the detriment
of social welfare.
A theoretical framework is developed in which established (\old") and new (\young") lobbies
overlap. There are two dierent types of lobby groups in the economy: low, and high. High type
lobbies promote projects that are socially productive for two periods, and low type lobbies promote
projects that are only socially productive for a single period.
A baseline specication provides two answers to the question; \why do politicians choose to
support lobbies for an ineciently long period of time?" First, lobbies whose social benets have
been exhausted (old low type lobbies) may receive support in a pooling equilibrium from lame-
duck politicians in return for side-payments. Since bad politicians maximize private rents and not
welfare, they have an incentive to support such lobbies for as long as possible. Second, bad-type
politicians may choose to separate from good-type ones (welfare-maximizers) so as to receive side
payments from current old low type lobbies. Bad politicians are not re-elected if they engage in
separating behavior.
13In an extension to the model, politicians are not able to observe the types of the lobbies seeking
support. This specication describes circumstances under which some lobbies are not willing to
enter the pool of potential lobbies. This is the case if the lobbies cannot be assured of future
support. Also, there are circumstances under which even a good politician chooses to support low
type lobbies ineciently long and is re-elected anyways because if they did not then the quality of
the pool of new projects would deteriorate.
In the equilibria of both the baseline model and its extension, pooling is socially desirable,
because it implies that bad politicians behave the same way as good ones. Pooling is also more
likely if the discount factor is high, because the more patient politicians are, the more important is
their expected future income or their decisions today, and the more likely they are to forgo short
term rents for future payos. Hence, the more patient bad politicians are, the more likely it is
that they make choices that are aligned with the voters' preferences. The two model specications
dier according to the level of transparency. In the baseline model, the government has enough
information to make choices that are aligned with the voters' preferences. Hence, voters can punish
the government if it does not behave according to their preferences. If the government does not
know the type of the lobbies, and this is known by the voters, then the latter accept a long term
bias in public spending. 21
The model developed in this paper is intended to give a theoretic explanation of why govern-
ments support lobbies beyond the point at which all productive benets have been extracted - and
are still rationally re-elected. The reasons why lobbies are supported ineciently long can explain
why some industries such as the agricultural and the defense industry have been able to receive
continued support from US and European governments in recent decades, even though it has been
questionable whether continued funding is benecial for a country as a whole.
21If the voters do not observe their payo until after they have to choose whether or not to re-elect the government,
then the equilibrium suggests that the voters only re-elect the government if it supports young lobbies. Hence, they
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Figure A1: Incumbencies of lobbies overlap
Proof 1 If the old lobby in period 1 is a low type and the young lobby is a high type: Bad politicians
receive E + k in period 1 if they support both lobbies. This reveals them as bad politicians, which
implies that they are not re-elected and hence do not receive any payments in their second period. If
bad politicians choose to support only the young lobby in period 1, i.e., if they choose to pool, they
receive E in period 1. In this case, bad politicians are re-elected and receive expected payments of
E + (2k   aH + (k   aL)) in their second period. Hence, if the old lobby is a low type and the
young lobby is a high type, then bad politicians pool if
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If both lobbies in period 1 are low types: Bad politicians receive k +k  aL +E if they separate
and an expected payo of E +E +(k +(k  aL)) if they pool with good politicians. Hence, bad
politicians pool if












Proof 2 If the old lobby in period 1 is a low type and the young lobby is a high type: The expected
spillovers to the voters are x + 2x if bad politicians pool. If bad politicians separate from good
ones, the expected benet is 2x. If both lobbies in period 1 are low types: The expected spillovers
to the voters is x if bad politicians pool. If bad politicians separate from good ones, the expected
voter benet is x. Hence, voter welfare increases if bad politicians choose to pool with good ones.
15Proof 3 Good politicians support both lobby types if the expected voter welfare from doing so is
higher than the expected voter welfare from supporting only young lobbies, i.e., if
(1   )22x + (1   )0 + (1   )2x + 20  x




Proof 4 Bad politicians pool with good ones if the expected payments they receive from pooling are
larger than the expected payments if they separate. The expected payments from pooling are
E + (k   aL) + k + (1   )(2k   aH) + (k   aL) + E
And the expected payments from separating are given by
E + (k   aL) + k + (1   )(2k   aH)













(1   )(2k   aH) + aL
Proof 5 As long as good politicians support old lobbies, the expected payo of high type lobbies
is positive. If good politicians do not support old lobbies, the expected payo of high type lobbies
becomes negative and they do not join the pool of potential lobbies.
Proof 6 Both pooling conditions of the baseline model are more restrictive than the pooling condi-
tions of the extension of the model. Three cases are possible:
(1) If the old lobby in period 1 is a low type and the young lobby is a high type and 1
2 <   1,
the pooling condition of the baseline model is more restrictive if
k

  (2k   aH)   (k   aL) > (
1

  2)k + (
1

  1)(1   )(2k   aH) + aL
which is the case since the expression above can be simplied as
aH(    + 1) > k(1      4   )
where the inequality has to hold because aH > k and (    + 1) > (1      4   ).
(2) If both lobbies are low types and 1





  )(k   aL) + k(
1

  1) > (
1

  2)k + (
1

  1)(1   )(2k   aH) + aL




  )(k   aL) + (k   aL) > (1   )(
1

  1)(k   aH)
The inequality holds because the left hand side of the equation is positive and the right hand side is
negative.





  )(k   aL) + k(
1

  1) > k(
1

  2) + aL
which is the case since
k > aL
Proof 7 The expected payo to the voters is x+(1 )2x if bad politicians pool. If bad politicians
separate from good ones, the expected payo to the voters is (1 )2x+x+(1 )(1 )2x.
As long as  < 1
2, without which pooling is automatic, the expected payo if bad politicians pool is
larger than the one if bad politicians separate from good ones. Hence, voter welfare increases if bad
politicians choose to pool with good ones.
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